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ABSTRACT
A study was made to determine what the barriers are to implementing
information systems at a fleet aviation squadron. Various squadron personnel
were interviewed on-site in order to find out what resources were available at
the squadron, how they were being used, and what new applications were
desired. Members of the information systems staff of the type commander
were interviewed as well. The data were analyzed and eight major barriers
were identified. Some of the barriers were under control of the squadron,
some were external to the squadron, and some were a blend of both. The
findings suggest that those barriers identified as squadron-controlled can be
overcome through careful planning, better utilization of on-board resources,
and establishment of a squadron computer training program. The primary
external barrier was the uncertainty of financial resources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Three (VQ-3) is homeported at Naval
Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii. The squadron currently flies the EC-130
and is undergoing transition to the Navy's newest aircraft, the E-6A. The
transition is to be completed while maintaining 24-hour operational flights. It
is the first time in the history of Naval Aviation that a squadron has been
directed not to stand down from operational flights while transitioning to a
new aircraft. Further, the squadron has been tasked to develop the plans and
procedures for a homeport change to take place a few years hence.
In addition to having a unique mission, the size of the squadron is
significant. The typical land-based, operational aviation squadron has
approximately 60 officers and 250 enlisted members, while VQ-3 has
approximately 110 officers and 550 enlisted members. The squadron antici-
pates personnel augmentation during its transition to the E-6A.
The homeport-shift and transition-related tasking imposed on the
squadron, in addition to meeting its mission requirements, has resulted in
increasing demands on its information processing capabilities. An exami-
nation of the information systems requirements of the squadron and an
evaluation of the effectiveness of its on-board assets was thought to be
needed.
B. OBJECTIVES
The goal of this thesis was to determine what is the nature of any
barriers to implementing information systems at VQ-3. In an era of increas-
ingly scarce resources, it would not be prudent to develop a plan to implement
a project without first examining whether it could be implemented. Thus,
early identification of barriers could enable planning around such barriers or
their removal, if possible, to ensure a smooth implementation.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The question to be addressed is what are the barriers to implementing
information systems in a fleet aviation squadron? It was thought initially that
an information systems architecture would be made followed by an
investigation of the barriers. However, to undertake the development of an
information system architecture for a squadron homeported in Hawaii from
Monterey was determined to be too ambitious considering the time that would
be involved and the required travel expense. After some discussion of the
matter, it was thought that even if a project had been undertaken to develop
an information systems architecture, a more important question was what are
the barriers to implementing those information systems in a fleet aviation
squadron? The word "implementation" in this thesis means that the system is
operational to the user.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of the research concentrated on what Automated Data Pro-
cessing (ADP) assets VQ-3 has available, how they are being used and what,
if any, other applications are desired. Additionally, availability of personnel
talent, top-management support, funding, type commander support, plan-
ning, and formal procedures were investigated.
The study was limited to one squadron because there are unique features
to each squadron that would make a generic study less useful than one that
focused in-depth on just one squadron. Further, the author was attached to
VQ-3 from July, 1982 until July, 1985 and possessed a comfortable working
knowledge of the squadron and its mission.
E. METHOD
The method used to address the research question was to interview key
members of the squadron and the type commander's staff about what
resources were available at the squadron, how they were used, and whether
new applications were desired. An informal discussion forum was adopted for
the interviews.
VQ-3 has ten departments: Administrative, Command Services, Oper-
ations, Safety/NATOPS 1
,
Maintenance, Training, FRAMP2 Communications,
Tactics, and Special Projects. In addition to interviews with each of the
department heads, the Commanding Officer (CO), the Computer Systems
Manager (CSM) and other personnel from the various departments were
contacted during an on-site visit. The Executive Officer (XO) was not
interviewed on-site due to his absence from the squadron. He had been con-
tacted previously by telephone. Similar telephone interviews were conducted
with the Assistant Force Information Officer and the Automated Data
1NATOPS (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization)
2FRAMP (Fleet Readiness Aviation Maintenance Personnel)
Processing Equipment Analyst of Commander Naval Air Force U. S. Pacific
Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC), the squadron's Type Commander.
No formal questionnaire was developed for the interviews, because the
author did not want to influence the respondents' comments. Discussions
were loosely focused on all facets of computer usage in the squadron.
The kinds of questions that were asked followed along the lines of:
• What information processing capabilities do you have in your
area?
• How are they used?
• What capabilities would you like to have?
These questions were asked to get the interview started, with comments
from the author to keep the discussion on the topic. During the course of the
interviews, a number of subsidiary questions were asked as follow-on ques-
tions to comments made by the respondents. Some of these questions were:
• Do you think your microcomputers are being used effectively?
• What computer training is available?
• What are your backup/recovery procedures and contingency plans?
• What do you foresee are barriers to implementing information
systems in the squadron?
The interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to one and one-half
hours. The author wrote comments of the respondents in note form. After all
interviews had been completed, comments were analyzed and the findings are
presented in the summary that follows.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Evaluation of data gathered from interviews, as well as a review of
various procedures, yielded the following barriers (issues, factors, problems)
pertinent to VQ-3. They are listed in descending order of frequency mentioned
in interviews:
• Funding constraints.
• Restrictive ADP acquisition procedures.
• Lack of support from the type commander.
• Lack of a formally trained Computer Systems Manager.
• Lack of top-management commitment.
• Lack of a formal command computer training program.
• Lack of a master information systems plan.
• Lack of a high-level planning committee.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The second chapter in this thesis is a discussion of various methods and
formal procedures in planning and designing information systems. Following
that discussion, the third chapter presents the data discovered during the
course of the study. The fourth chapter presents the findings, and the fifth
chapter discusses the implications of the findings and gives some
recommendations.
II. CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents some considerations in implementing information
systems. Included are discussions on background information of the
squadron, the problem definition, information systems planning, system life
cycle development, and acquisition. These topics are mentioned because care-
ful consideration of them can make implementation of information systems
smoother.
B. BACKGROUND
The author was assigned to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Three
(VQ-3) from July, 1982 until July, 1985. During that time, the squadron grew
from approximately 70 officers and 300 enlisted to approximately 110 officers
and over 500 enlisted and became a fully operational squadron. This growth
had tremendous impact on the processing and movement of information
within the squadron.
Growth of the squadron meant that a larger number of messages, special
requests and memoranda were processed in addition to the required reports,
instructions and directives. In addition, there was a 67% increase in the
number of annual enlisted evaluations which were composed and prepared as
well as a 57% increase in annual officer fitness reports, not including those
reports required for each officer at the change of command which occurs every
15 months.
The word processing facilities consisted of eight Wang terminals, of
which five had printers. This necessitated creative alternatives since not
every department had a Wang terminal. Timesharing agreements were
devised among departments, but were not always successful, especially when
a high priority item overrode the timeshare schedule. Added to the already
over-burdened facilities was the mindset that all documents such as forms,
memoranda and rough drafts of enlisted evaluations and officer fitness
reports as well as other internally distributed items had to be typed.
The management oversight for the word processors fell to the squadron
CSM. This officer's function consisted of ordering supplies such as diskettes,
print wheels and ribbons, coordinating maintenance requests and checking
the server to prevent overloading the Wang. Requests for additional ADP
equipment were initiated by the requesting departments and coordinated
through the CSM. Aside from ordering computer-related supplies, the func-
tion of the CSM was reactive versus proactive.
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The problem in the squadron is that VQ-3 has a collection of incompati-
ble computers and faces increasing demands as it transitions to a new aircraft
and prepares for a homeport shift.
Paperwork remains the number one gripe throughout the Navy. Despite
passage of the Paperwork Reduction Act in 1980, there is little evidence of
reduced paperwork requirements in the day-to-day operations at VQ-3.
Efforts to improve the mechanics of handling paper and processing informa-
tion have amounted to augmenting the Wang with a collection of stand-alone
microcomputers, added incrementally to the squadron from 1985 to 1988.
The present collection of microcomputers has all but eliminated the elec-
tric typewriter, and the ease with which text can be manipulated or changed
upon the drafter's whim using the word processor has contributed to the
everything-must-be-typed mindset. In order to accommodate this hunger for
typed documents, it would seem that a planned, carefully evaluated strategy
would be undertaken to assure that adequate word processing assets would
be available. Not only has this not occurred, but in addition to having micro-
computers which are in some cases incompatible, there have been additional
stand-alone systems introduced into the squadron to handle aviation logistics
matters.
According to Liefer, in order for a computer-based information system to
be effective, it must be one which fits the organization's culture and style.
Using Mintzberg's organizational characterizations, one of which was called a
machine bureaucracy which is "characterized by standardization, functional
structural design, and large size," Liefer states that a computer-based infor-
mation system in a machine bureaucracy is "...primarily concerned with com-
puterization of the paperwork processes of the firm." [Ref. 1]
As VQ-3 would seem to fit the definition of a machine bureaucracy, it
was suspected from the outset that what the squadron needed was an Office
Automation System (OAS). There is a veritable plethora of plans concerning
many topics within the Navy, but there seem to be no figures available to dis-
tinguish which have been implemented. In light of the recent budget curtail-
ments, it becomes more important to plan carefully any information system,
including the ability to carry out the plan once it is adopted. In actuality,
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identifying the barriers to implementing such a plan might, in some ways, be
akin to a feasibility study.
D. PLANNING FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Just as an organization has a plan for achieving its goals, such as
targeting a market area to increase sales for example, an organization must
have a plan for using information systems to support the objectives of the
organization. The information systems plan should detail the system to be
developed and a schedule for its development [Ref. 2]. Supporting documen-
tation might include an estimate of the effort involved in terms of personnel,
financial and time.
Such plans are especially important to organizations operating under
tight resource constraints. They help to focus the drive of the systems toward
integration of the organization's efforts to support the overall command goals.
Thierauf speaks of certain elements to developing such a strategy that
include a plan that supports the business goals of the organization, top man-
agement commitment to develop and to implement the recommendations of
that plan, and lastly, that the end-product of the plan must be user-owned;
that is, the user must recognize its responsibility and commitment both to
developing the system and implementing it [Ref. 3].
According to Burch and Grudnitski, there are four phases to an informa-
tion systems plan:
• Identification of Priority Systems
In order to align a system plan with the command's goals, activities that
are critical to the success of the command must be identified and a
matching priority assigned to the system that supports that goal.
• Information System Objectives and Capabilities
This phase evaluates the current information systems activities and
determines future user requirements.
• Development Assessment
During this phase, three components of the organization are evaluated:
systems architecture, hardware and software, and systems personnel.
The objective is to align what exists with what is needed.
• Implementation Strategy
The last phase of the plan maps a strategy for bringing the plan from the
drawing board into operation and includes a detailed description of the
basic functions and features of the new system, interfaces with other
systems, and a list of anticipated hardware and software requirements.
[Ref. 2]
Planning, in and of itself, can be simply an exercise. To be effective in the
area of information systems, Thierauf suggests some guidelines [Ref. 3]. The
first guideline considers the establishment of a high-level information sys-
tems planning committee. This committee would review existing systems as
well as plans for modifications and new systems to ensure that they support
the objectives of the organization.
The second guideline is to communicate what strategic information sys-
tem planning is. According to Thierauf, it is "...the vehicle used to arrive at
concurrence with top management on IS directions and the means by which
the IS organization begins to compete for scarce corporate resources...."
[Ref. 3] In short, it sets the tone for the organization with regard to
information systems planning.
Strategic plans, the third guideline suggests, must be proactive rather
than reactive. Proactive planning means seeking out what is needed in an
organization and planning for it ahead of time rather than resorting to a
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knee-jerk response to a user requirement. It would serve to reduce the time
and effort and sometimes resultant ill-effects of crisis-management.
Finally, the fourth guideline refers to continuity in information systems
planning. It is important to review the plans continuously to ensure their
support of the goals of the organization, that they are a "living plan" of the
future [Ref. 3]. Use of a plan in such a fashion enforces it as a management
tool rather than relegating it to a paperwork exercise.
E. SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE DEVELOPMENT
The methodical development of information systems has evolved to what
has become known as a Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) [Ref. 4]. A
key word here is "evolved" because the SDLC is still in a state of evolution.
However, in the classical sense, an SDLC generally involves the following
phases:
Assess the current operation.
Define user requirements.
Determine alternative solutions.
Evaluate and select hardware and software.
Develop the system design.
Build the system.
Implement the system.
Maintain the system. [Ref. 4]
There are many SDLCs, but the intent is the same, which is to approach
the development of a system in a methodical, phased manner.
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Assessing the current situation is the first major phase in the SDLC. In
order to suggest a system to replace an existing one, a thorough understand-
ing of the current system is in order [Ref. 4]. In addition to identifying limita-
tions of the present system, such an assessment presents an opportunity to
explore areas for improvement. But perhaps more important in this phase,
and sometimes overlooked, is to take the time to study the feasibility of
implementing a system in an organization, or to determine what barriers
exist to its implementation. Considerations of any barriers up-front would
allow the system designers to design around such barriers, or may even, if the
barriers are determined to be insurmountable, end the process at that point
which would save scarce resources.
The next phase in the cycle is to define the user requirements. Although
requirements often continue to evolve during the life cycle, it is important to
focus on the needs of the user. It is imperative that the requirements be
defined as clearly and completely as possible to avoid discovering a new
requirement later in the cycle that would involve costly expenditures of
resources to backtrack in order to include the new requirement. Further, it is
important to realize that although aviation squadrons have similar reporting
requirements, there may be slight differences in mission requirements or
significant differences in squadron hangar facilities that would impact a
system.
Following user requirement definitions is a look at alternative solutions.
There may be occasions when slight modifications to an existing system
would fulfill the requirement, or it may be determined that automating a non-
automated system would not yield additional benefits to the organization.
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It is only after assessing the current situation, denning user require-
ments and evaluating alternatives that hardware and software should be
selected. To select it prior to those three phases would be like buying building
materials for a house without first determining a budget, buying land, draw-
ing up plans and finding a contractor.
After an understanding of the requirements is gained, which is balanced
against the current system, and after hardware and software are selected, it
is time to design the information system. If a completely new system has been
chosen, this is the "make or buy" decision period; that is, it is the time to
decide to develop a system completely in-house, to purchase an existing sys-
tem or to develop parts "in-house" supplemented by off-the-shelf products
[Ref. 2].
Following the design phase, the system is built and then implemented.
Some of the issues to be considered during the implementation phase are the
support provided to the users of the system, education and training of users
as well as planning for a smooth transition to the new system.
The last phase in the cycle concerns maintenance of the system. This is a
phase which is often overlooked, but one which will endure for the life of the
system. This is the phase where good documentation procedures, followed in
previous phases, will pay-off in terms of easing the implementation of later
changes and modifications to the system.
13
F. ACQUISITION
COMNAVAIRPAC provides microcomputers to VQ-3 based on availabil-
ity of funds3 . Since the funds come from Operations and Maintenance, Navy
(O&MN) dollars, the same pot of money that flying hours, steaming hours,
ammunition, or, "beans, bullets and black oil" come from, COMNAVAIRPAC
maintains control over the amount of money spent on computers so that
other, presumably more important, expenditures are not skipped. No Pacific
Fleet squadron has money in its own budget with which to buy a
microcomputer.
Despite not having money in its own budget for microcomputers,
squadrons are free to submit requests through their chain of command to
COMNAVAIRPAC to request a computer. Such requests are governed by
COMNAVAIRPAC Instruction 523 1.1A which states that requests for data
processing equipment must be accompanied by a draft of the Abbreviated
System Decision Paper (ASDP) [Ref. 5]. The purpose of the ASDP is to justify
the equipment and includes the following:
• Need. Outline the need for automation as related to specific elements of
the activity's mission. Briefly summarize the functional requirement and
the information dependent tasks that the information system would
process. Describe the current method; quantify and evaluate the impact
of maintaining current capability.
• Proposed Solution. Summarize the selected automatic data processing
solution (including hardware and software) intended to satisfy the infor-
mation processing need, and identify various assumptions and
constraints considered in the selection. Indicate milestone schedule of
planned events, e.g., target dates for acquiring equipment and imple-
menting various applications.
3 Telephone conversation between Mr. Bill Landy, Code 242, COMNAVAIRPAC, and
the author, 7 February, 1989.
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• Other Alternatives Considered. Summarize other alternatives con-
sidered and explain why each was not selected as a proposed solution to
the need for automation.
• Cost and Benefits. Summarize projected costs (personnel, hardware,
software, and facilities) of each alternative in becoming an operational
system and identify the expected benefits (improvements to functional
support, cost savings, etc.) Give cost/benefit rationale for selecting the
recommended alternative. Analysis should include quantitative factors
as well as qualitative.
• Interface Considerations. Describe planned and potential interface
with systems/procedures external and internal to the organization.
Indicate anticipated advantages or problems associated with system
interfaces. Data communication requirements should be addressed in
this section.
• Funding. Are funds available to support the life cycle costs for the
selected alternative? Identify the source and type of funding.
• Other Comments. Include any additional information that will facili-
tate understanding and evaluating this ASDP. Training, security/
privacy, maintenance, mobility and site preparation requirements should
be addressed in this section. [Ref. 5]
The paragraph in the ASDP that specifies funding sources does not
mention that because funds for ADP equipment come from O&MN funds, the
cost/benefits must be justified over a one year period. A squadron that decides
to pursue this avenue to obtain more ADP equipment must understand the
one-year budget constraint under which the acquisition of microcomputers is
administered.
G. SUMMARY
The goals and objectives of an organization need to be communicated to
its members and information system requirements should be formulated into
a plan that supports those goals and objectives. To address such a plan, a
high-level information systems planning committee is needed to review
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existing systems and determine the requirements for new systems to support
the objectives of the command. Planning in such a manner emphasizes a
proactive stance with regard to information systems and would do much to
avoid a crisis management response to a valid requirement. Additionally,
continuous reviews of such plans would enforce the plan as a management
tool rather than a paperwork drill, and would provide credence to requests for
additional ADP assets.
The planning committee should follow four phases to establish an infor-
mation systems plan:
• Identify priority systems
• Determine information systems objectives and priorities
• Assess the current information systems
• Establish an implementation strategy [Ref. 2].
Once a plan has been decided upon, the SDLC provides a methodical,
phased approach to developing an information system for that system which
has been given the highest priority by the planning committee. Upon reaching
the step of obtaining hardware and software for the new system, the ASDP
should be developed and submitted to COMNAVAIRPAC for approval.
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III. ACTUAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS AT THE SQUADRON
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the major elements of operation of the existing
information systems at the squadron. Included are discussions on planning,
hardware and software resources, information processing, personnel
resources, training, systems procedures, orientation towards computer usage,
acquisition, and possible enhancements to the system.
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS PLANNING
Information systems planning consists of occasional memos from the
Special Projects Officer to the XO outlining what ADP assets are at the
squadron. Recommendations are included for asset distribution when the
arrival of new equipment is imminent. Normally, a request is routed to all
department heads for inputs for this memo, but it is drafted by one person
who may or may not have an information systems background.
Knowledge of other resources in the squadron, such as personnel talent,
is communicated through casual conversation. Finding out who the "hackers"
are in the squadron is a function of happenstance as is finding out what the
various departments are doing to use their computers.
Although department heads meet with the XO and CO at various times
during the week, there is no formal meeting process to discuss specifically the
planning for information systems in the squadron.
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C. CURRENT HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE RESOURCES
As of November, 1988, VQ-3 possessed a total of 21 computer terminals,
distributed as shown in Table 1. All of the terminals are stand-alone systems.
The Zenith computers use Wordperfect software for word processing and also
use Lotus 1-2-3 and D/Base II or D/Base III. In addition, the squadron uses
the Wang word processing system as well as a Xerox 860 for a total of three
word processing products. Furthermore, due to a difference in their operating
systems versions, text files created on the Z-120 terminals cannot be used on
the Z-248 terminals or vice-versa. None of the diskettes created on a Zenith
can be used on a Wang, nor can a Wang diskette be used on a Zenith.
TABLE 1. CURRENT COMPUTER RESOURCES AT VQ-3
COMPUTER DEPARTMENT NUMBER USE
Z-120 Tactics 1 Word processing
Z-120 Administration 2 Word processing
Z-120 CO's yeoman 1 Word processing
Z-150 Communications 1 Server
Z-248 Administration 1 Word processing,
spreadsheet
Z-248 Operations 2 Word processing,
database
Z-248 Maintenance 2 Word processing,
spreadsheet
Z-248 Training 1 Word processing,
graphics
Z-248 FRAMP 1 Word processing,
spreadsheet,
database
Wang
'
w/printer Safety/NATOPS 1 Word processing
Wang w/printer Maintenance 3 Word processing
Wang w/printer Administration 1 Word processing
Wang terminal Special Projects 1 Word processing
Wang terminal Communications 1 Wcvd processing
Wang terminal Maintenance 1 Word processing
Xerox 860 Administration 1 Word processing
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D. INFORMATION PROCESSING
Initial drafts of most documents are prepared manually; that is, with
pencil or pen and paper. Most documents that are routed up the chain of
command are typed on a word processor. However, because the terminals are
stand-alone, any changes made by a department necessitate that the docu-
ment be retyped on that department's word processor, if it was originated on
an incompatible computer, before being forwarded to its next destination. All
of the documents that are routed around the squadron are tracked as they
enter and leave each department by making manual entries in a department
correspondence logbook. In addition, a department that prepares follow-on
documents to the original must cull appropriate information from
accompanying documents to enter into its own computer.
Take, for example, a request from the Special Projects Department for
one of its members to attend a meeting in Washington. The individual drafts
a memo to the Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) Officer via the CO, the XO
and the Administrative Officer. After typing the memo on its Wang terminal,
the Special Projects Yeoman, located on the east side of the hangar, calls the
Administrative Department to see if that department's Wang printer is in use
because the printer has no buffer. If the printer is free, the yeoman will print
the memo and then walk across the hangar to the Administrative Department
on the the second floor of the hanger to retrieve it. After proofreading the
memo and if there are no changes, the memo is manually logged out of
Special Projects in the correspondence log and hand-carried to the XO on the
west side of the hangar.
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Following his review, the XO forwards the request to the CO for
approval. From the CO, the memo is routed to the TAD Branch located on the
east side of the hangar where information from the memo concerning the
individual's travel requirements is entered into the TAD Branch database.
From that information, supporting travel documents will be prepared to
include orders, a per diem request, and any necessary outgoing messages.
Upon completion of the TAD request, the package is manually logged out of
the TAD Branch and hand-carried back to the Administrative Department for
review before being hand-carried to the Personnel Support Detachment (PSD)
on base for processing.
Notification of approval of the travel request is usually made by tele-
phone to the individual who made the request. It then is incumbent on the
individual to notify, either via memo, telephone or personal visit, any other
department in the squadron that needs to know of the absence, such as
Training, Safety/NATOPS or Operations.
Most of the documents in the squadron are routed to at least one other
department, requiring an entry in a manually kept logbook. Since diskettes
do not accompany a document, any changes made by the receiving depart-
ment must be reentered into its terminal for a smooth copy for forwarding. In
the event that no changes are made, if the gaining department needs infor-
mation from the document in its database, it must be input at that point.
A large number of routed documents are accompanied by supporting
documents such as exhibits, photocopies of appropriate references, messages
or previous memos on the topic. The squadron also routes a large number of
personal requests which use a specific form and are often hand-written. Many
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of these requests (leave, advancement, crew changes, special programs or
school) are also accompanied by supporting documents. It is the desire of the
CO that such documents remain in their present form to preserve the per-
sonal touch.
E. PERSONNEL RESOURCES
Each squadron has an officer assigned to the ADP function, and VQ-3 is
no exception. Referred to as the Computer Systems Manager, that officer is
responsible for ADP security, the hardware, software and accompanying doc-
umentation, ordering and distributing all ADP-associated consumables such
as ribbons, print-wheels and diskettes as well as computer training and
acquisition. There are no enlisted personnel assigned to the ADP function. As
is the norm for a Navy squadron, the CSM is assigned to an aircrew, regularly
stands watches and performs any other duty he is assigned. Because he is
away from the squadron for a period of two weeks in a recurring five-week
cycle, any ADP-related issue, except those pertaining to consumables, must
wait for his return for resolution.
The CSM reports to the Special Projects Officer, usually a Lieutenant
Commander, in the Special Projects Department. The CSM assignment is
regarded as a junior officer billet and is normally held by a junior Lieutenant.
The current CSM, by his own admission, has no formal training in the
use of computers, nor does the Special Projects department head. He is, in
essence, "self-taught." By the time he gains sufficient knowledge to feel com-
fortable in the job, he will be rotated to another billet, as it is not career-
enhancing to remain in that job for more than a year.
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There are at least four officers in the squadron who have formal
information systems training, two are graduates of the Computer Systems
Management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, one has an
undergraduate degree in computer science and one worked as a programmer
for NASA for four years before entering the Navy. To date, only two of the
officers are working with a computer, one is writing a program to generate a
daily flight schedule using the programming language of Pascal, and the
other is writing programs to track TAD funding using Lotus 1-2-3. Any other
individuals in the squadron with formal information system training are
unknown to the CSM.
F. INFORMATION SYSTEMS TRAINING
The Training Department is responsible for EC- 130 aircrew training, the
Maintenance Department is responsible for EC- 130 maintenance training and
the newest department, FRAMP, has been assigned the duty of training for
the E-6A. There is no training department for computer systems. However,
the Navy Regional Data Automation Center (NARDAC) at Pearl Harbor
offers training in the use of microcomputers. Table 2 lists some of the courses
offered, their length, and their cost.
To send an individual to NARDAC for training, the squadron must take
the funds from its O&MN account. To date, the squadron has not budgeted for
such training courses nor is there a desire to spend money for such training. 4
Any training an individual obtains is the result of asking whoever held the
4 Interview between E. Perini, Lieutenant, USN, VQ-3, and the author, 21 November
1988.
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TABLE 2. MICROCOMPUTER TRAINING
Navy Regional Data Automation Center
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COURSE TITLE LENGTH COST
Introduction to
Microcomputers:
Beginner
Advanced
172 day
1/2 day
$50
$50
Introduction to DOS:
Beginner
Advanced
1 day
1 day
$95
$95
Wordstar 2 days $155
dBASE III Plus:
Introduction
Advanced
2 days
2 days
$155
$155
LOTUS 1-2-3:
Introduction
Advanced
3 days
2 days
$225
$155
job previously, or seeking out someone in the squadron who might know
something about the terminal in question. Although qualifications and their
attendant training are required by Navy directives for aircrew and aircraft
maintainers, there are no formal qualifications attached to computer usage.
Within the squadron, the CSM is charged with many computer-related
responsibilities among which is training. To his knowledge, there are no
training materials available within the Navy, such as a self-paced program, to
import to the squadron so that individuals could receive training. The only
materials available for instruction are the vendor's documentation manuals
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and help from another member of the squadron who learned the system from
another member of the squadron, and so forth.
G. COMPUTER SYSTEMS PROCEDURES
In addition to not having a formal information systems training plan,
there is no squadron instruction for the standardization of computer control
procedures such as backup/recovery, contingency plans, end-user computing
or documentation. Security procedures, addressed in a squadron instruction
which outlines access control, are being enforced. The CSM does, however,
maintain procedures over the procurement and disbursement of diskettes,
print-wheels and ribbons. However, the information collected in the logbook
used to account for such consumables is not used for any purpose other than
for re-order determination.
There are no formal procedures that require backup of either diskettes or
hard disks. Individuals who use the computers have either not thought of
backup or have thought of it but have not bothered, adopting the "it can't
happen to me" attitude concerning disk failure.
The squadron, located on a tropical island, is sometimes threatened by
hurricanes or tropical storms and their accompanying hazards such as power
outages and flooding within the hangar. There are no contingency plans to
safeguard either the computers or the data which they contain against freaks
of nature, fire or other natural or man-made disaster.
End-user computing is encouraged only by its lack of prohibition. The
officer who is writing the Pascal program to generate a flight schedule has
been given use of a Z-248 and a free reign over the program. However, when
asked about his documentation procedures, he indicated that he had done no
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documentation thus far but would do it all at the end. The Operations Officer
has not expressed concern about the lack of documentation for a program
which is to generate the flight schedule for which he is responsible, and the
CSM (who is one paygrade junior to the Operations Officer) feels helpless to
force documentation completion concurrent with the program development.
As a general rule, officers in the squadron can expect three job assignments
during a three-year tour. The officer writing the program can expect to rotate
out of his current assignment in Operations within a few months to take his
second or third assignment before leaving the squadron altogether5 .
H. ORIENTATION TOWARDS COMPUTER USAGE
The smoothness with which new technology is accepted is heavily
dependent on the attitudes of the people, organizations and institutions
involved. There is a variety of attitudes present at VQ-3 and, as would be
expected, at the type commander level, COMNAVAIRPAC, who controls com-
puter acquisition for Pacific Fleet squadrons.
Although COMNAVAIRPAC would like each squadron to have a mini-
mum of four microprocessors, it doesn't believe that a squadron has an
infrastructure to support information systems. Further, it believes that 70%
of any squadron's work is generic, with the remaining amount dependent on
the personality of the commanding officer. Funding is not made available to a
squadron that wants NARDAC to perform a system requirements survey
5 Telephone conversation between S. Call, Lieutenant, USN, VQ-3, and the author, 7
March 1989 revealed that the author of the computer program had been sent to Texas for a
four-month temporary assignment leaving no documentation to the program. Personnel in
the squadron are unable to run the program and have reverted to a manual system.
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because COMNAVAIRPAC believes that NARDAC does not produce a timely,
quality product. In addition, no such studies are funded because COM-
NAVAIRPAC already knows that squadrons need more computers but
because it doesn't have funding to acquire them, it feels that such a study
would be a waste of money6 .
Within the squadron, both the CO and XO are regarded as supportive of
the use of computers. However, aside from a recent request to COMNAVAIR-
PAC for twelve more microprocessors, there is little evidence to support this.
Indeed, the CSM has no formal training, nor does he anticipate receiving any.
There is no long-term plan for information systems. There is no formal train-
ing plan for computer usage. There are no standard backup/recovery plans,
contingency plans or documentation procedures. Lastly, the CSM billet is not
regarded as being "career-enhancing."
The "what if . . .?" syndrome is prominent in the squadron and colors the
way in which computers are regarded. For example, there is a reluctance to
let go of paper copies of documents and reports. It is not enough to have
information on a diskette, but paper copies must be kept, not only because of
the lack of terminals on which to display the data (neither the CO nor XO
have terminals, for example), but because of the fear that the computer might
dump or that the data, once changed, might need to be changed back to its
original form. Additionally, there is a great fear of computer viruses, of
unauthorized access, of circumvention of the chain of command if a network
were to be installed, and of problems if "the system goes down."
6 Telephone conversation between CDR Stansel, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC, and the
author, 9 February 1989.
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As a follow-on to the reluctance of eliminating paper documents, there is
the dilemma of how to handle correspondence that has accompanying mes-
sages, memos, photocopies of references or other exhibits. This produces an
attitude that that particular problem falls into the "too hard" category and
thus the utilization of computers in the squadron is questioned.
I. ACQUISITION
The Comptroller at COMNAVAIRPAC retains control of funding for all
computer acquisitions for the squadrons. The Functional Wing Commander
remains within the chain of command, but only to recommend or not recom-
mend approval of each request. Funding for computers comes out of the
O&MN account. Dollars from that account also pay for flying hours, ship
steaming hours, ammunition and spare parts. Since the business of COM-
NAVAIRPAC is not computers, computers are low on its list of priorities.
Despite scarce funding, COMNAVAIRPAC would like each squadron to have
a minimum of four microprocessors. Any attempt by one squadron to obtain
more than four computers is regarded by COMNAVAIRPAC as a loss of a
computer for another squadron.
Umbrella contracts have been the mainstay of computer acquisition for
squadrons in the COMNAVAIRPAC claimancy. Unique applications for a
computer must be well documented as COMNAVAIRPAC prefers a generic
approach to information systems. Coupled with the long lead-time involved
with buying a system, changing contracts from time to time results in
different microprocessors being purchased for the same squadron which leads
to the inevitable problem of incompatibility.
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Like the rest of the Federal Government, COMNAVAIRPAC operates
with a one year budget. Even though the squadron submits a request for new
computers that, over a period of years, saves money as compared to continu-
ing the use of an existing system, COMNAVAIRPAC must consider the
cost/benefit analysis in light of one year funding. Because of the competition
for O&MN dollars, often the funding isn't available.
Once a computer is purchased and delivered to the squadron, COM-
NAVAIRPAC ceases all support. There are no training visits, no assistance to
set up the system and no additional funding to obtain any training. There is
no attempt by COMNAVAIRPAC to establish an infrastructure within the
squadron to support information systems.
J. POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS
All of the department heads would like a better way to process corre-
spondence. A document is input into several different computers, depending
on the routing of it. This has fostered the feeling that computers don't save
time at the squadron, but instead, they create work due to the multiple
handling of a document.
There are mixed feelings about a network at the department head level.
Although the CO expresses interest in it, there is concern by some that the
integrity of the chain of command could be compromised. Some individuals,
those who have used networks at other commands, recognize the benefits of a
network and are of the opinion that the benefits far outweigh any
disadvantages.
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The most prevalent sentiment is a desire to improve paperwork process-
ing. Ideas include electronic mail, databases for tracking aircrew qualifica-
tions and flight hours as well as one-time input to a computer of enlisted
evaluations and officer fitness reports.
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IV. FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the eight major findings from the various inter-
views. In addition to the findings, a breakdown as to which barriers are
internal to the squadron, external to the squadron, and a blend of both is
included.
B. THE BARRIERS
There are barriers to implementing information systems at VQ-3. They
are a mixture of some that are under the control of the squadron, some that
are external to the squadron, and others that are a blend of both. The barri-
ers, listed in descending order of frequency mentioned in the interviews, are
followed by a letter "I" to indicate that it is internal, a letter "E" to indicate
that it is external, and a letter "B" to indicate that it is a blend of both inter-
nal and external:
• Limited, uncertain resources (E).
• Lack of compatible ADP equipment (E).
• Lack of infrastructure to support computer usage (B).
• Attitude that the CSM billet is not career-enhancing (B).
• Lack of top-management support of computer systems procedures (I).
• Lack of a formal computer training program (I).
• Lack of a master information systems plan (I).
• Lack of a high-level information systems planning committee (I).
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Nearly everyone interviewed mentioned the first two barriers in their
comments. The problem of incompatible computers is an outgrowth of the
funding problem and so was thought of as going hand-in-hand with funding.
The next two barriers, the lack of infrastructure to support computer
usage and the attitude that the CSM billet is not career-enhancing was
mentioned by less than one-half of the squadron personnel interviewed, but
was remarked upon by both individuals on the type commander's staff.
Top-management support and computer training were commented on by
two individuals at the squadron, one of whom was the Computer Systems
Manager. The last two items, lack of a master plan and lack of a planning
committee were mentioned by the XO and the Computer Systems Manager,
respectively.
Those barriers that are internal to the squadron can be controlled; that
is, the squadron can influence change to overcome them. External barriers
can be influenced by the squadron to the extent that the squadron can work
through the system to attempt changes; however, the final outcome on those
rests beyond the squadron. Those barriers that are a blend require that the
squadron work for change within its organization as well as work though the
system to strive for changes beyond its organizational level.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The study was undertaken to determine what barriers exist to imple-
menting information systems at VQ-3. An on-site visit to the squadron to
interview the CO and all of the department heads was made. Discussions
focused on what information system assets were currently on-board, how they
were being used and what capabilities were desired. Additionally, discussions
included supporting assets such as personnel talent, access to training and
budget considerations. Finally, approving authorities at the type commander
level were interviewed to determine how decisions were made in the acquisi-
tion ofADP equipment.
There are barriers to the implementing information systems at VQ-3.
They are a mixture of some that are under the control of the squadron, some
that are external to the squadron, and others that are a blend of both. The
barriers are:
• Limited, uncertain financial resources.
• Lack of compatible ADP equipment.
• Lack of infrastructure to support computer usage.
• Attitude that the CSM billet is not career-enhancing.
• Lack of top-management support of computer systems procedures.
• Lack of a formal computer training program.
• Lack of a master information systems plan.
• Lack of a high-level information systems planning committee.
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B. IMPLICATIONS
VQ-3 has no master plan for information systems. Planning traditionally
has consisted of memoranda describing the change of placement of a micro-
computer within the squadron spaces. There has been no broad brush look at
identifying those areas critical to the running of the squadron with an effort
to match computing power with those areas. Planning is characterized as
"reactive" as opposed to "proactive."
It is not surprising, therefore, when there is no master plan, to find that
there is no high-level information systems planning committee. There are
weekly department head meetings with the XO and daily operational brief-
ings with the CO, XO and department heads, but information systems plan-
ning is not addressed through its own formal process. Such matters as may
arise are treated on a case basis thus reinforcing a reactive planning mode.
The lack of compatible equipment at VQ-3 is not unique within the Navy.
Due to budgetary constraints and acquisition procedures, which are a matter
of public law, a variety of stand-alone systems exist at the squadron. This
results in wasting valuable man-hours in a time when the squadron faces
major transitions.
That there is no formal computer training program at a command that
puts such a strong emphasis on training is remarkable. No department is
tasked with the responsibility for providing computer training. The Training
Department is charged with the task of aircrew training, the Maintenance
Department has responsibility for aircraft maintenance training, and the
Administrative Department concentrates on administrative training proce-
dures. The importance of computer training is not recognized. The CSM has
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no resources with which to train nor does he have personnel assigned to him
for assistance. The training of personnel at NARDAC Pearl Harbor has not
been pursued because of budget constraints. Because of this lack of training,
personnel cannot effectively use the microcomputers in the squadron.
The CSM billet is not regarded as career-enhancing. Traditionally,
assignments in an aviation squadron that are considered ticket-punchers are
those in the Operations and Maintenance Departments. Since the ADP func-
tion falls in neither, it is not highly regarded either within the squadron nor,
more importantly, by a promotion selection board. It stands to reason, then,
that the squadron would assign a very junior officer to such a billet, one who
would have time left in the squadron for a tour in either operations or
maintenance.
The current Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD), which lists the
personnel that are required for assignment to the squadron, does not require
the assignment of an officer with formal computer training, such as a gradu-
ate of the Naval Postgraduate School Computer Systems Management
Curriculum. Such officers are designated, upon graduation, with a 0095P sub-
specialty code. In order for a squadron to guarantee obtaining a "p-code"
officer, another COMNAVAIRPAC activity would have to give up a "p-coded"
officer to provide compensation and the squadron's SQMD would have to be
formally modified, requiring approval from the Chief of Naval Operations to
reflect that requirement. Thus, there is no guarantee that VQ-3 would have
the infrastructure available to support information systems. However, there
is considerable talent within the squadron, admittedly assigned by chance,
that is vastly underutilized. There are two officers currently assigned who
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have formal training from the Naval Postgraduate School. Regrettably, their
expertise is limited for use within the departments to which they are
assigned.
Along with the lack of a high-level information systems planning com-
mittee, there is a lack of top-management support for formal computer sys-
tems procedures. There is a squadron instruction that addresses ADP
security; however, there is no formal instruction establishing procedures for
backup/recovery, contingency planning, or documentation requirements. Each
department is free to use its microcomputer as it desires.
The lack of financial resources, a barrier that is external to the
squadron, is perhaps the most significant. For not only is there a lack of funds
to procure new equipment, there is a lack of funds available for outside assis-
tance to enable the squadron to get a handle on its current resources. The
type commander's adamant refusal to approve funding to allow an outside
organization such as NARDAC to lend systems analysis assistance can only
be interpreted as a lack of top-management support to the squadron for
information system planning support.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Some of the barriers outlined above are outside the purview of the
squadron, notably the attitude that the CSM billet is not career-enhancing,
the lack of support from the type commander for outside assistance and
acquisition and budget procedures. However VQ-3 can take charge of the
following:
• Establish a high-level information systems planning committee.
• Develop a master information systems plan.
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• Establish a formal computer training program within the squadron.
• Examine ways to strengthen the CSM billet.
• Emphasize top-management support of information systems.
• Submit well-researched, thoroughly evaluated ADP-related requests to
COMNAVAIRPAC using the ASDP format.
A planning committee consisting of all of the department heads as well
as the squadron CSM and headed by the XO should be established. Addition-
ally, any officer reporting to the squadron for duty who has a 0095P sub-
specialty code or other formal computer training should automatically be a
member of the committee for the duration of his or her tour. This committee
would provide a forum within which to trade ideas, discuss on-going depart-
mental efforts of computer use and determine priority of system projects. This
forum could also be used to find out where the personnel talent is in the
squadron to make more effective use of it. Questions such as who will admin-
ister squadron databases, who will own them, and who will be responsible for
maintaining them must be addressed. Having the CSM as a member of this
committee will serve to empower him so that he can coordinate and carry-out
the actions that the committee directs.
An output of the planning committee should be a master plan for the
squadron. Currently, each department does what it desires with its micropro-
cessor; there is no oversight or coordination among departments. In addition
to addressing what systems and assets the squadron has, the plan should
consider what future enhancements would involve.
A training program must be established to train personnel to use more
effectively the microprocessors that are currently on-board. It would be
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inconceivable to put untrained individuals on an airplane with "how-to" man-
uals to teach themselves how to fly. So, too, it is unthinkable to give people
microprocessors and a few manuals and expect them to teach themselves
while simultaneously doing their job with no loss in productivity.
With more microcomputers available than the average Pacific Fleet
aviation squadron, VQ-3 must submit carefully researched, well thought-out
requests for additional computer resources. The establishment of a planning
committee and development of an information systems plan by the squadron
would significantly contribute to the validity of any additional requests. How-
ever, in consideration of increasingly scarce resources, VQ-3 must get a
handle on the resources it currently has before requesting more.
It is understandable that with the upcoming transition to a new model
aircraft and downstream change of homeport the CO and XO have higher
priorities than microcomputers. However, it is well-documented that systems
projects do not succeed without top management support [Ref. 6]. Since type
commander information systems plans do not include plans at the squadron
level, it is imperative that the squadron take the initiative to establish such a
plan which necessitates the commitment of the CO and XO if it is to be a use-
ful management tool rather than a paperwork drill.
As for those barriers that are a blend of external and internal to the
squadron, a follow-on study could be undertaken to determine the feasibility
of establishing an infrastructure within aviation squadrons to support
computer use.
The barriers that address funding and incompatibility are beyond the
squadron to overcome. However, a follow-on study could be performed to
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discover the impact of uncertain, limited funding on computer systems and
the resultant mix of incompatible computers that are acquired as a result.
Finally, it would appear advisable for the squadron to take seriously the
issues and recommendations raised in this thesis.
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